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Summary
•	 Sexual exploitation and abuse continue to pervade peacekeeping missions, and peace-
keepers benefit from near-total impunity.
•	 Several seminal United Nations (UN) studies and expert reports provide a useful blueprint 
of where the gaps lie, what must be done to address them, and how to do so. 
•	 Zero-tolerance UN policies have focused on preventing new abuse and strengthening 
codes of conduct. These goals are laudable but undermined when not accompanied by 
consistent discipline and criminal accountability.
•	 Despite eight years of annual resolutions that underscore the need to address the prob-
lems, there is no evidence of greater accountability.
•	 More work is needed to finish the job. States are responsible for disciplining and punish-
ing their troops, but the UN must do more to ensure that this happens. 
•	 The UN needs to work actively with states to bridge the gaps in domestic legislation by 
issuing written advice and publishing model legislation. 
•	 The UN should publicly name and shame those states that fail to investigate and pros-
ecute credible cases.
•	 The UN should refrain from accepting troop contingents from countries that repeatedly 
fail to live up to their written assurances to investigate and prosecute. 
•	 The memorandum of understanding governing the relationship between the UN and 
troop-contributing countries should be further revised to introduce greater conditionality 
into the acceptance and removal of troop contingents.
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Exploitation and Abuse
Despite peacekeepers’ enormous contributions to and sacrifices for the cause of peace and 
security, they have increasingly been associated with sexual exploitation and abuse of the 
vulnerable populations they are mandated to protect. Tragically, they benefit from near-
total impunity. It is a reality that the presence of peacekeepers in countries with precarious 
legal and social structures can foster sexual exploitation and abuse. 
In countries as diverse as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), East Timor, Eritrea, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, 
and Somalia, numerous examples of rape, pedophilia, prostitution, and other forms of sexual 
exploitation and abuse have come to light in recent decades.1 The effect of such abuses is 
stark. Not only is it a direct one for the most vulnerable segments of society, its ramifica-
tions for the reputation of peacekeeping initiatives and the UN generally are also extremely 
wide, potentially impeding the organization from successfully carrying out other aspects of 
its mission.2
Peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilian populations and indeed to prevent the 
heinous acts of mass sexual violence that have become synonymous with many modern-day 
conflicts. This responsibility is the ethos of their mission.3 In June 2013, the UN Security 
Council adopted a resolution on women, peace, and security in which it requests “the Secre-
tary-General to continue and strengthen efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance on 
sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel and urges concerned Member States to ensure 
full accountability, including prosecutions, in cases of such conduct involving their nationals.”4 
This resolution is preceded by numerous others making nearly identical requests. Seminal 
reports by experts have been commissioned and revised memorandums that afford the UN 
much stronger powers of oversight have been signed, yet years after a series of comprehensive 
strategies were recommended in 2006, little appears to have changed: accountability remains 
the exception to the rule, new abuses continue to be reported, and the business of sexual 
exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping continues. The inevitable result of complacency and 
unimplemented strategies is impunity among peacekeepers.
This impunity can be construed as a symbol for double standards. In 2011, the UN 
secretary-general adopted a human rights due diligence policy that requires all security 
sector support provided by the UN to be consistent with its obligations to respect, promote, 
and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law. The 
policy reflects the need for the UN not to be associated with such abuses. However, if the 
UN imposes conditions on its collaboration with local government troops, is it not just 
as important that the UN’s contingents are free of the stain of abuse, particularly sexual 
violence? In 2013, allegations of mass rapes allegedly perpetrated by certain government 
troops in the DRC reportedly led the UN to review parts of its security sector support in 
the country. Yet at the same time, the scores of sexual exploitation and abuse allegations 
levied against UN troops in the DRC have remained unanswered and unpunished since the 
early 2000s. These inconsistent standards send mixed messages and undermine the broader 
significance of zero tolerance for sexual violence.
This report considers the myriad steps taken by the UN and its member states to address 
the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. In particular, it assesses the 
efforts taken to increase criminal accountability. Significant barriers continue to impede 
criminal investigations and prosecutions of peacekeepers and other personnel for crimes 
related to sexual exploitation and abuse.
Given the UN’s lack of competence over disciplinary and criminal matters, and the absence 
of an appropriate international criminal tribunal to prosecute crimes associated with sexual 
exploitation and abuse, focus has turned to national investigations and prosecutions, which is 
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appropriate.5 Both would normally be undertaken by the troop-contributing countries. In light 
of the limited success with such prosecutions to date, however, a number of expert studies 
have also recommended, somewhat controversially, that greater attention should be paid to 
the possibility for the host state—the state emerging from conflict where the peacekeepers 
are stationed and where the crimes are understood to have taken place—and possibly other 
states as well to carry out complementary investigations and prosecutions.
This report canvasses what has been proposed and what steps have been taken and argues 
that, despite the progress, much more needs to be done if accountability is to be assured. The 
barriers to investigations and prosecutions are known; the options to remedy them have been 
meticulously set out in a series of reports. Nevertheless, significant gaps remain. The failure 
to routinely prosecute and punish abusers undermines other laudable prevention efforts and 
makes a mockery of the victims and all that they have endured. Addressing the criminal law 
barriers is thus a necessary component of any strategy to eradicate sexual exploitation and 
abuse in peacekeeping missions. It remains a pressing concern.
In March 2013, the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) released its latest 
annual report, in which it revealed that sexual exploitation and abuse remains a significant 
problem in peacekeeping missions.6 The reported number of fresh allegations has dropped 
from the peak seen in the early 2000s, which is a positive indication that preventive measures 
are slowly working.7 However, the figures still remain unacceptably high even without taking 
underreporting into account.8 In 2012, sixty fresh allegations were reported in ten field mis-
sions.9 Significantly, the rate of related criminal prosecutions remains negligible.
The notorious incidents from the late 1990s and early 2000s propelled a series of initia-
tives	aimed	at	tackling	the	problem.	In	2005,	Prince	Zeid	Ra’ad	Zeid	Al-Hussein’s	landmark	
study drew much-needed attention to the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse on 
missions and recommended remedial measures.10 Many of the recommendations have since 
been implemented. In particular, standards of conduct have been clarified for all troops,11 
the model memorandum of understanding that regulates the relationship between troop-
contributing countries and the UN was amended,12 and a special prevention task force 
has been created.13 Protocols for assistance and support to victims have been issued.14 
Outreach, mandatory training, and other broader measures of prevention have been stan-
dardized across peacekeeping missions.15 In addition, an arm’s length administrative inves-
tigation structure has been put in place.16
Yet the Zeid report also drew attention to the need for greater and more consistent 
recourse to disciplinary and criminal action, and it is these measures that have proved to be 
most difficult to implement.
Criminal Accountability
The difficulties in investigating sexual violence allegations are well documented. Indeed, 
experience from international criminal tribunals and courts underscores the fact that unless 
both a well-defined operational strategy and investigators specially trained in the inves-
tigation of such crimes are in place, evidence of a sufficiently high quality is unlikely to 
be available.17 The stigma, fear, trauma, and isolation engendered by such crimes require 
special investigation strategies. This need is especially pronounced when both the suspects 
and the investigators are foreign. Nonetheless, the challenges to properly and adequately 
investigate sexual exploitation and abuse cases will exist regardless of the perpetrators 
and the nationality of the investigators. These challenges, coupled with the general lack of 
interest in rigorous investigation, make it unsurprising that many of the allegations are not 
known to have resulted in criminal prosecutions.
In 2012, sixty fresh allegations  
were reported in ten field missions. 
… The rate of related criminal 
prosecutions remains negligible.
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According to the UN Model Status of Forces Agreement, troop-contributing countries 
have the exclusive responsibility to discipline and criminally sanction their military con-
tingents.18 Even for other types of personnel for whom the troop-contributing country 
does not have exclusive jurisdiction, the overwhelming practice has been for the UN to 
refer the case to the troop-contributing country anyway.19 When allegations of serious 
misconduct are made, the UN can repatriate the individuals concerned, make recommenda-
tions to the troop-contributing country, and ban the individual from future peacekeeping 
operations. When suspects are returned to the troop-contributing country, contingents 
can and should be subject to that state’s criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction. However, 
as Françoise Hampson has noted, holding such trials entails certain practical difficulties, 
including accessing evidence in the host state. Local laws also will not always allow for 
extraterritorial prosecutions.20 Finally, gaps or loopholes may prevent certain categories 
of persons or certain types of offenses from being prosecuted.21 Thus, when the troop-
contributing country fails to act for any of those reasons, the result is impunity.
Information on troop-contributing country investigations and prosecutions is patchy and avail-
able primarily through anecdotal public news reports. This is largely because the UN Department of 
Field Support’s Conduct and Discipline Unit has published only generalized statistics, not informa-
tion on completed prosecutions per troop-contributing country. The statistics note the aggregate 
number of responses the Conduct and Discipline Unit has received to its queries but not which 
states have responded or the nature or adequacy of the responses.22 The media have focused only 
on particularly notorious or well-publicized incidents. Recently, a Pakistani court martial operating 
in Haiti reportedly found several Pakistani police officers guilty of sexual exploitation and abuse, 
but this case appears to be more an exception than the rule.23 Numerous credible allegations have 
not resulted in prosecution. For example, preliminary information implicating fourteen Moroccan 
troops serving in Côte d’Ivoire—including DNA evidence showing that some had fathered chil-
dren—reportedly did not result in conclusive evidence and led the Moroccan government to drop all 
charges.24 Multiple allegations against Indian peacekeepers for being involved in a child prostitution 
ring in the DRC are likewise not known to have resulted in prosecutions.25 In a relatively recent 
case involving allegations that Uruguayan peacekeepers sexually abused a teenage boy in Haiti, the 
media coverage led the Uruguayan president to issue an apology. Nevertheless, apparently because 
of the paucity of evidence—despite the existence of video footage—the accused soldiers have not 
been charged with sexual violence but with much lesser “coercion” offenses.26
The successful prosecution of sexual exploitation and abuse allegations requires exper-
tise at the outset to determine how best evidence can be collected and used. It requires 
particular expertise in working with witnesses who have a history of marginalization, have 
experienced significant trauma, face severe cultural taboos when coming forward to give 
evidence, or fear reprisals. Such expertise is available within the UN system from the ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals, though not always available among domestic military 
prosecutors, whether these come from a troop-contributing country or a host state.
obligations of troop-Contributing Countries
The model memorandum of understanding that regulates the relationship between troop-
contributing countries and the UN was amended in 2007 in response to the recommenda-
tions of the Zeid report.27 It now provides clearer emphasis on to the need to ensure criminal 
responsibility for acts of sexual abuse and exploitation carried out by national contingents of 
troop-contributing countries on peacekeeping missions. This effort has been accomplished by 
providing assurances, information sharing, authorizing the UN to carry out initial investigations, 
and vetting candidates before deployment.
Gaps or loopholes may prevent 
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•	 Providing assurances. Troop-contributing countries are now required “to assure the United 
Nations that it shall exercise such jurisdiction with respect to such crimes or offences,”28 
and that “the case is forwarded to its appropriate authorities for due action” by authorities 
who “shall take their decision in the same manner as they would in respect of any other 
offence or disciplinary infraction of a similar nature under its laws or relevant disciplinary 
code.”29 However, this assurance cannot be legally enforced, though it carries moral weight 
and sets the stage for the UN to engage in a dialogue with states on the concrete steps 
they have taken to provide the assurance.
•	 Information sharing. The troop-contributing country is now obligated to “notify the 
Secretary-General of progress on a regular basis, including the outcome of the case.”30 This 
step	is	a	significant	advance.	In	2005,	Hampson	noted	that	
there is evidence of a lack of follow-up. Apparently at least 90 percent of 
repatriated CIVPOL [civilian police] officers’ cases are not followed up by the 
United Nations. Part of the problem is that there is no obligation on the sending 
State to supply information with regard to disciplinary/criminal proceedings 
against repatriated officers. Another possible difficulty is the administrative burden 
that might be imposed by effective follow-up.31 
That troop-contributing countries are now obliged to report to the UN on the progress and 
outcome of misconduct investigations and prosecutions is therefore an important improve-
ment.32 However, not all states have responded to requests for information. The 2012 statistics 
hover	around	a	50	percent	response	rate.33 This is much higher than in previous years but much 
lower than it should be. Each allegation merits a response. Furthermore, the responses factored 
into	the	50	percent	statistic	are	not	necessarily	full	and	complete	disclosure:	Responses	may	
entail only acknowledgment of receipt and an indication of what further steps are envisioned.
The UN only makes public the aggregated statistics and refrains from naming and shaming 
particular countries. Although this is understandable from the perspective that the UN relies on 
the continued support of troop-contributing countries and does not wish to risk hurting those 
relationships, the policy also reduces the importance and strength of the information-sharing 
exercise. If the countries concerned do not risk public shame, incentive for compliance is reduced.
•	 Authorizing the UN to investigate. The UN will typically have some role in the preliminary 
administrative investigation of allegations. It may be the first to hear the allegations. Even 
when it does, if the troop-contributing country has exclusive jurisdiction, the allegation will 
need to be processed and transferred to that country. Per the new obligation to share informa-
tion, however, the UN should also receive, process, and catalogue all information from troop-
contributing countries. The revised memorandum entitles the UN to carry out preliminary 
fact-finding investigations in cases of serious misconduct if necessary to preserve evidence 
and when the troop-contributing country does not conduct its own.34 The UN’s Investigations 
Unit of the OIOS is also authorized to initiate an administrative investigation if the sending 
state is unwilling or unable to do so.35 This is an important new power for the UN and may 
help safeguard evidence and establish, at least on a preliminary basis, the relevant facts. In 
principle, it should ease the way for any criminal investigation the responsible country may 
choose to undertake.36 If the UN investigation is done without sensitivity, however, evidence 
may be inadvertently tainted or the chain of custody broken, thereby making it more difficult 
or even impossible for a claim to proceed to trial.
•	 Vetting candidates. Troop-contributing countries now have an obligation of “vetting 
candidates for national armies and security forces to ensure the exclusion of those associ-
ated with serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including 
sexual violence.”37 This effort is aimed at ensuring that those with poor records of behavior 
are not selected for future missions. At present, the UN has little ability to monitor such 
Troop-contributing countries are 
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processes to ensure they meet minimum standards. It is also unclear what it means to be 
associated with the listed crimes. One assumption is that the phrase ‘associated with’ is a 
broader formulation than ‘convicted of.’ In other words, it is assumed that the proviso is 
meant to apply not only to individuals convicted of the relevant crimes but also to others 
somehow affiliated with acts of criminality, regardless of whether they were investigated 
or prosecuted. This would make sense in light of the difficulties associated with criminal 
investigations and prosecutions but may be difficult to implement. States that have formal 
selection processes tend to focus on issues such as hierarchy, rotational demands, and 
the like. Individuals convicted of offenses are often disbarred from the military or police 
and thus not eligible. Given the few adequate investigations and prosecutions, the list of 
individuals who have been convicted is short; reprimands and denials of privileges typically 
follow proven misconduct. In the absence of a conviction or a negative finding, what other 
form of proof might deny individuals the privilege of serving in a peacekeeping mission? 
In sum, the new model memorandum is a positive step, but a number of gaps remain. The 
obligation of troop-contributing countries to provide assurances and to share information is 
an important lever for accountability. However, the failure of the Conduct and Discipline Unit 
to publish detailed statistics per country and of the secretary-general to publish more reveal-
ing summaries in his annual reports is highly unfortunate. More transparent reporting would 
provide a better incentive for states to comply with their commitments to investigate and 
prosecute sexual exploitation and abuse. At present, the statistics provide only a veneer of 
follow-up. Appropriate follow-up would consist of detailed information on the results of inves-
tigations, any charges filed, disciplinary procedures and prosecutions, and broader measures of 
prevention to guarantee nonrecurrence. Further, the memorandum does not clarify or define 
the crimes that should be subject to investigation and prosecution. Thus the extent to which 
conduct will be subject to prosecution entirely depends on the applicable criminal law, and 
standards will vary from country to country.
Host State Role
In	2005,	also	in	response	to	the	Zeid	report,	the	UN	General	Assembly’s	Special	Committee	on	
Peacekeeping Operations recommended that a group of legal experts be appointed to advise 
how best to overcome the remaining legal barriers to criminal accountability of peacekeep-
ers, staff, and experts on mission.38 The Group of Experts was formed and issued its report in 
2006. The report proposes a number of strategies to end impunity, including the possibility 
for states to agree to a new convention on the matter.39 The Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly (the Legal Committee) has retained the item “criminal accountability of United 
Nations officials and experts on mission” on its annual agenda ever since and continues to 
discuss the Group of Experts recommendations in that forum.40
The Group of Experts report provides a detailed overview of the barriers to accountabil-
ity and outlined wide-ranging steps to be taken by both the UN and its member states to 
address such barriers. The principal challenges are extending the jurisdiction to investigate 
and prosecute and addressing disparities in national criminal law.
Extend Jurisdiction to Investigate and Prosecute
The report leaves unchallenged the exclusive jurisdiction of the troop-contributing country 
to investigate and prosecute its military contingents. It suggests a much greater role for the 
host state in relation to all other categories of personnel (beyond military contingents) and 
envisions a role for other states to investigate and prosecute as necessary.
More transparent reporting 
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One of the main recommendations is to have greater recourse to the host state for inves-
tigations and prosecutions of peacekeeping officials, UN staff, and experts on mission.41 
These categories of personnel have functional immunity—meaning that they cannot be 
prosecuted or incur civil liability for acts undertaken in the fulfillment of their official 
functions. The host state would therefore have competence to investigate and prosecute 
any acts undertaken in a private or unofficial capacity. The recommendation contains two 
main elements.
Both the Zeid and the Group of Experts reports recommend that functional immunity be 
waived to allow the host state to investigate and prosecute where appropriate. It has always 
been the right of the UN secretary-general to waive this immunity; the reports recommend 
that the secretary-general exercise this discretion much more liberally. Indeed, the Group 
of Experts report seeks to make the waiver of immunity a priority, given that the host state 
is where the crimes took place and thus where the witnesses and evidence are to be found; 
holding the trial in the host state would also have the most concrete impact on the affected 
victims. However, despite these benefits, the UN is unlikely to waive immunity in order to 
enable the host state to exercise criminal jurisdiction if its legal system is dysfunctional 
or if the ability of the local justice system to guarantee fair trials is in doubt. Given that 
peacekeeping operations are typically operating in a conflict, quasi-conflict, or postconflict 
context, such concerns are often, if not typically, present.
In light of fair trial concerns, the Group of Experts report also recommends helping the host 
state exercise criminal jurisdiction through capacity-building initiatives aimed at strengthen-
ing its justice system. However, this too seems unrealistic given the need to carry out speedy 
investigations and preserve evidence and to ensure that trials take place without undue delay. 
Legal system strengthening is typically a long-term process and is unlikely to bring any major 
shifts in capacity in the short term, regardless of the intensity of training inputs. The Zeid 
report proposes encouraging the host state to accept support from the UN to ensure that crimi-
nal proceedings against UN personnel satisfy international human rights standards. The Group 
of Experts points out that this would lead to a separate standard of treatment for international 
officials but that the concern should not automatically rule out this course of action: “Some 
accountability may often be better than none for the victims.”42
The Group of Experts report also points to the possibility of establishing a hybrid tribunal in 
the host state to include international elements, as was done in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and 
Cambodia.43 This arrangement requires the consent of the host state and is typically resource 
intensive. However, in instances of widespread sexual exploitation and abuse in particular 
missions, such as the DRC, it may be appropriate and worth pursuing.
Even when the host state cannot undertake the entire investigation and prosecution, 
whether for lack of capacity or any other reason, the Group of Experts report also recommends 
helping the host state provide support or technical assistance to carry out investigations. This 
action, it argues, would have the benefit of allowing “evidence to be gathered promptly by 
the host State and transmitted through mutual legal assistance channels to the state under-
taking the prosecution. The prompt and effective gathering and preservation of evidence by 
the host state’s investigatory authorities can also facilitate its own conduct of future criminal 
proceedings when its judicial and other authorities become fully functional.”44 However, the 
extent to which evidence gathered by a host state or the UN in a preliminary administrative 
investigation will be admissible in the courts of another state carrying out the prosecution will 
depend on the laws of the other state. For example, Canada has indicated that under its legal 
system, using evidence from foreign sources such as UN fact-finding reports would be difficult 
without the direct involvement of the victims in the process.45 
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Informing the OIOS as soon as possible after allegations are made would facilitate the 
early determination of whether the host state or any other state may have jurisdiction to 
prosecute and thereby help ensure that the collection and preservation of evidence complies 
with the laws of that state. The Zeid report also rightly recommends that 
an expert in military law, preferably a prosecutor, from the troop-contributing 
country concerned should participate as a member of any investigation of members 
of its contingent. That will ensure that the investigation gathers evidence in a 
manner that satisfies the requirements of national law so that further action can 
be taken if it is concluded that misconduct has occurred.46
other States
The Group of Experts report recommends that states other than the host state have jurisdic-
tion to investigate and prosecute peacekeeping crimes. It has indicated that the exercise 
of jurisdiction by other states “should be complementary; that is, to the extent that the 
host state does not have the capacity to exercise jurisdiction, the greater the need for 
other states to exercise jurisdiction, the greater the need for other states to do so.”47 The 
report tends to consider the role of troop-contributing countries as subsidiary to the role of 
the host state. This does not align with the practice that tends to privilege the role of the 
troop-contributing country over that of the host state, even when the troop-contributing 
country does not have exclusive jurisdiction to discipline and punish.
The Group of Experts also recommends that states establish universal jurisdiction over 
peacekeeping crimes, the rationale being that when a crime is carried out in the peace-
keeping context, the abuse of power implicit in the crime makes what would normally be 
an ordinary crime (not normally giving rise to universal jurisdiction) into an international 
crime that all members of the international community have an interest in prosecuting.48 
This is an important finding that recognizes the special gravity of crimes committed in 
the peacekeeping context. Because it goes beyond current treaty frameworks for crimes 
under international law, the Group of Experts report recommends introducing an extradite 
or prosecute provision into a new proposed treaty to enable states other than the host 
state to exercise jurisdiction when the host state is not in a position to prosecute. States 
other than the host state and the troop-contributing country might have an interest to 
prosecute if an alleged offender is found on their territory. It is less likely, however, that 
they would request extradition of a suspect if that suspect is not their national and the 
offense had no direct impact on their citizens. This is certainly the experience of universal 
jurisdiction prosecutions for crimes already recognized under international law. The vast 
majority of prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction have concerned individuals 
found on the territory of the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction or where nationals of 
the state seeking to prosecute were victims of the crimes. In only a few instances have 
states sought to extradite individual offenders, even though doing so is permitted in 
certain treaty frameworks.49
International Criminal Court
Extending the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to specifically cover peace-
keeping abuses would be difficult given that many of the top troop-contributing countries—
such as India, Pakistan, Nepal, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Egypt—are not states parties of the 
court. Furthermore, the crimes over which the court has jurisdiction are presently limited to 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It is certainly arguable that sexual exploi-
tation and abuse by peacekeepers may, in limited circumstances, fall within the definition 
of crimes against humanity or war crimes, but it is unlikely that the Office of the Prosecutor 
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would emphasize individual peacekeepers’ acts of sexual exploitation and abuse unless carried 
out on a widespread and systematic basis and thus already arguably a crime against humanity. 
Extending ICC jurisdiction without this link to crimes against humanity is also likely to over-
whelm a court that is already overstretched and significantly underresourced.
New Special Court
A new special court could be established to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed 
within the peacekeeping context if the troop-contributing country is unable or unwilling to 
investigate or prosecute. This structure would be similar to the complementarity provisions 
of the ICC. It could be achieved by treaty, though effectiveness would then depend on which 
states decided to ratify the treaty, unless ratification were a precondition to accepting troops 
from any country. Such a precondition might dissuade many countries from participating 
in new missions. However, according to the Group of Experts report, for many categories of 
peacekeeping personnel, the number of persons available or made available for consideration 
by the UN often exceeds the number of posts.50 Involvement in peacekeeping missions can 
be lucrative for certain states. Thus it is not clear that in all cases a precondition would act as 
a form of dissuasion. Demand may not always outstrip supply. However, given that relatively 
few countries supply the vast majority of troops, it would be important that these countries 
express their commitment to such an approach.
A special court could also be established by resolution of the UN Security Council under 
Chapter VII. Presumably this would not be an ad hoc court to deal with past instances of 
criminality, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or for the former Yugosla-
via, where the link to maintaining or restoring international peace and security was perhaps 
more evident. Here we are concerned with a forward-looking institution, potentially with 
a permanent structure. It is highly unlikely that such a structure would be acceptable to 
permanent Security Council members, however.
Address Disparities in Domestic Criminal Law
The standards of conduct set out in the 2003 bulletin on special measures for protection 
from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse now apply to all categories of peacekeeping 
personnel, whether military contingents, police observers, UN personnel, or volunteers.51 
This is an important sign of progress. However, not all acts of sexual exploitation and 
abuse amount to criminal conduct. The 2003 bulletin and other UN disciplinary codes on 
the subject outlaw a wide range of conduct but do not distinguish between acts that may 
constitute criminal offenses and acts that may result in disciplinary action only.
Some of the most typical forms of sexual exploitation and abuse that peacekeepers are 
known to have engaged in are not explicitly reflected in international humanitarian law trea-
ties. No uniform coverage of such conduct therefore exists in domestic criminal law statutes. 
For instance, not all troop-contributing countries will have either the same minimum age 
of consent for sexual relations or the same approach to prostitution. Sexual exploitation of 
women and young persons is not uniformly recognized as a crime by troop-contributing coun-
tries. When peacekeepers—the persons sent by the international community to protect the 
civilian population—engage in this behavior in a conflict or postconflict context, the dynam-
ics change, and gravity is added. The additional gravity arguably warrants the criminalization 
of conduct that otherwise might amount only to a breach of discipline. The criminal codes 
of troop-contributing countries and host states vary in terms of what constitutes a criminal 
offense under domestic law, the breadth of the criminal offenses that can be prosecuted when 
they take place outside the territory of the troop-contributing country (extraterritorially), and 
the seriousness attributed to such offenses and the applicable punishments.
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Given the nature of military operations, military criminal law regularly extends to the 
acts of serving military wherever they might be operating. The state of nationality can hold 
a court-martial for the offending soldier for any act that contravenes the applicable law. The 
same is not true for police or civilian experts serving in or supporting peacekeeping opera-
tions, to whom military law would not usually apply. In the latter cases, ordinary criminal 
law applies. Such law is primarily territorial—that is, it does not apply to acts that take 
place outside the country, a few specific enumerated exceptions aside. Sexual violence and 
exploitation are not typically recognized as exceptions. For instance, under Canadian law, 
the limited exceptions that allow for extraterritorial jurisdiction focus on when an inter-
national legal obligation to prosecute exists or a prosecution relates to fulfilling Canada’s 
essential interests: “Canada would extend jurisdiction over crimes committed by Canadian 
nationals while serving as United Nations officials or experts on mission only when they fall 
within one of those exceptions.”52 American law is similarly limited. At present, it is only 
possible to prosecute the felony offenses of civilian employees, contractors, and contract 
employees of the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to the extent that their 
employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.53 
The law does not extend to civilians working in support of the mission of other agencies. 
This gap gained notoriety when Dyncorp contractors allegedly linked to trafficking rings in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina could not be criminally prosecuted in the United States. Efforts to 
close the remaining gaps in the law have thus far been unsuccessful.54
Whether conduct will be subject to criminal proceedings will depend on the legal frame-
work of the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction. The offensive conduct will therefore lead 
to different results, depending on local laws and how they are applied. Complicating mat-
ters further, some troop-contributing countries prosecute only if the conduct constitutes a 
comparable crime in the host state, thus making prosecutions contingent on the legislation 
of countries with fragile legal systems emerging from conflict.
These disparities in criminal law lead to at least two problems. First, it is difficult for clarity 
and transparency as well as for morale when conduct outlawed in codes of conduct applicable 
to all troops and related personnel of a peacekeeping mission leads only to the possibility 
of criminal sanctions for soldiers coming from a limited number of countries. Accountability 
standards should be applied across the board. Second, an ill-fitting domestic criminal law 
framework for peacekeeping abuses may result in prosecutors trying to fit the misconduct 
they are confronted with into other well-established crimes, even when the facts clearly do 
not match; this process can ultimately result in judicial rejection of charges. This situation 
was particularly prominent in Somalia missions: Prosecutions for several notorious instances 
of torture failed because directly relevant criminal offenses were not in the statute books of 
troop-contributing countries.
Draft a New Convention?
A central recommendation of the 2006 Group of Experts report was to develop a new inter-
national convention to regulate the criminal liability of peacekeepers.55 The convention 
would signify the importance attached by the international community to such crimes, 
which “cannot, in view of the circumstances in which they were committed, be regarded 
merely as ordinary crimes.”56 It could also ensure greater consistency in the criminalization 
of conduct. It could address issues such as the different bases for states to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the criminal conduct of peacekeepers, whether as the host state where the 
crimes took place, the troop-contributing country, or any other state that could step 
in when the former state does not act—a form of a subsidiary “prosecute or extradite” 
clause. As indicated earlier, a new convention is arguably required to recognize what 
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would normally be considered an ordinary crime as a crime under international law 
meriting universal jurisdiction. The convention could also facilitate the exchange of 
information and evidence between states and between the UN and states, as well as 
ease cross-jurisdictional investigations.
Arguably, some issues could be addressed in ways other than a new convention: by the 
troop-contributing countries through revisions of their laws and criminal procedures, or by 
changes to the memorandum of understanding.57 Such ad hoc approaches, however, cannot 
resolve other issues, such as extending extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction for states, harmo-
nizing criminal law standards relating to peacekeeping offenses, strengthening mutual legal 
assistance, recognizing evidence by foreign sources, and potentially more smoothly regulating 
jurisdiction between the host state, troop-contributing countries, and other states.
Support for a new convention has been mixed. All states that have commented on the 
text recognize the need to counteract impunity for peacekeeping abuses and that immuni-
ties and other procedural barriers should not impede criminal prosecutions: “A zero-toler-
ance policy with regard to sexual abuse and other criminal acts should remain the guiding 
principle.”58 Countries that contribute significant troops and related personnel to peace-
keeping missions, such as Nigeria and Bangladesh, have expressed their commitment to 
the principle of accountability, though they have made no direct reference to the proposed 
convention.59 Countries such as Congo, the DRC, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well 
as the European Union have spoken in favor of a new convention.60 The UN Secretariat has 
as well.61 India and the United States, however, have indicated that they are not convinced 
that a multilateral convention is the most effective way to ensure accountability.62 Other 
countries—such as Israel, El Salvador, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine—have sug-
gested more useful starting points. That is, consideration of a convention is premature.63
In a series of successive General Assembly resolutions, states have been encouraged to 
plug the gaps, by—among other ways—establishing jurisdiction over serious crimes com-
mitted by their nationals while serving as UN officials or experts on mission, cooperating 
with each other and with the UN in exchanging information, and facilitating the conduct 
of investigations and prosecutions.64 These resolutions are important in drawing attention 
to the need to address the issue of criminal accountability. However, the resolutions are 
not in and of themselves binding obligations, and thus far, from the record over the past 
eight years since the annual resolutions have begun to be adopted, no evidence indicates 
that they have led to greater accountability. The Sixth Committee of the United Nations 
continues to collate information on the extent to which national laws allow for investiga-
tions and prosecutions. Responses have varied. Quite a number of states have given very 
generalized statements as to the adequacy of their internal legislation. Few have highlighted 
areas where gaps may exist. The secretary-general has collated much of this data in annual 
reports yet without any independent analysis. The sense that emerges is thus somewhat 
contradictory: The vast majority of allegations have not resulted in prosecutions, yet states’ 
procedural and substantive legislation seems, on the basis of what the states are reporting, 
free from significant gaps.
The pattern of lukewarm reporting and cut-and-paste General Assembly resolutions has 
continued since 1996. New allegations continue to emerge and be added to a growing list 
of allegations that have not resulted in criminal accountability.
Recommendations
The UN and its independent experts have undertaken critical work in identifying the prob-
lems related to ensuring accountability among peacekeepers. Now that the gaps are known, 
more sensitive and targeted work is needed to finish the job. 
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The UN, however, does not appear to see pressing states further in this direction as its 
role. It is the ultimate responsibility of states to ensure that those sent on peacekeeping 
missions are capable of meeting the highest standards, to discipline their peacekeep-
ing personnel and ensure criminal accountability, to come together to agree on a new 
convention, and to amend domestic laws to cover jurisdiction over troop contingents on 
peacekeeping missions. 
For UN-mandated operations, however, the UN bears institutional responsibilty for 
acts and omissions that take place within the mission context. Numerous courts have 
recognized this.65 The responsibility requires more than a laissez-faire approach: The 
UN should acknowledge itself as having an active and persistent role in helping states 
close the gaps in disciplinary and criminal accountability, even if it is not for the UN 
to discipline and punish.
Much greater use of the UN’s tools under the new memorandum is in order and straight-
forward:
•	 Naming and shaming states that fail to investigate and prosecute. The concept is nei-
ther new nor novel. It is in fact the basis on which much of the UN Human Rights Council and 
its special procedures operates.
•	 Actively working with states to bridge gaps in domestic legislation. This would include 
issuing written advice, publishing model legislation, and engaging directly with states. The UN 
has extensive experience in providing support and technical assistance to states to strengthen 
the rule of law and enshrine human rights. 
•	 Refraining from accepting troop contingents from countries that repeatedly fail to 
live up to written assurances to investigate and prosecute. This discipline will require 
an attitudinal change within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: developing an arm’s-
length distance from the states that supply troops. Presently, the department’s seeming inability 
to do so affects both its credibility and its ability to carry out its mandate. Decisions on condi-
tioning the acceptance of troop contingents should be taken by more neutral agencies, such as 
a dedicated team within the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
The memorandum might also be further revised to introduce greater conditionality into 
the acceptance and removal of troop contingents.
Troop-contributing countries are slow to investigate and reluctant to prosecute alleged 
offenders for a variety of reasons. Weak legislation and poor investigations capacity are 
technical issues that can be addressed through relevant reforms. However, in addition, 
peacekeeping is a source of pride for troop-contributing countries. None wish to draw 
attention to any stain of abuse. This is natural and underscores the importance of the 
UN’s publicizing more concrete information about abuse allegations. The UN, however, 
does not wish the allegations to be made public either: Abuse allegations that affect 
troop-contributing countries also affect the UN. Transparent reporting thus carries a 
double disincentive. 
The instances of sexual exploitation and abuse that have come to light have mainly been 
reported by whistleblowers, NGOs, or humanitarian agencies, not by complaint structures 
or the UN. If publication were more transparent, troop-contributing countries would have a 
greater incentive to undertake full and complete investigations and prosecutions, and the 
UN would have a stronger incentive to maintain the pressure. 
Lack of interest in accountability also stems from the allegations themselves. A sense 
prevalent in many militaries around the world is that boys will be boys, that allowances should 
be made for peacekeepers who are far from their families, and that these kinds of abuses are 
natural and inevitable. Such stereotypical attitudes are slowly being addressed on the preven-
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tion side by training and awareness programs before and after deployment and more explicit 
codes of conduct. They will only take hold, however, if they are accompanied by strong policies 
of enforcement when abuse allegations emerge. This was the clear message of the G8 ministers 
in their April 2013 Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, when they affirmed 
that “more must be done to address these ongoing crimes, including by challenging the myths 
that sexual violence in armed conflict is a cultural phenomenon or an inevitable consequence 
of war or a lesser crime.” It would be an anathema for so much rhetoric to be expended on 
countering the abhorrent practice of sexual violence in conflict without simultaneously taking 
the clear steps identified since 2006 to tackle the persistent problem of sexual exploitation 
and abuse by peacekeepers. The two challenges go hand in hand.
A clearer roadmap to a new convention might be prepared under the auspices of the 
UN General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, identifying annual 
targets to foster progress. The resolutions are an important starting point in identifying 
applicable principles. They could be developed into a more precise set of principles for 
troop-contributing countries to be signed off before UN acceptance of their troops. The 
committee could also coordinate with the Human Rights Council to appoint an independent 
expert to carry out audits on each existing and prospective troop-contributing country: 
essentially an independent scorecard on compliance. Such audits could be compulsory, 
made public, and considered by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Bad 
scorecards without annual improvements should lead to the suspension of contributions 
from the particular state. One worry is that the greater regulation might be avoided if 
states circumvent the regulation by doing more peacekeeping either through other multi-
lateral institutions, such as the African Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
or through informal state coalitions. This is already happening, though perhaps for other 
reasons. It is therefore important to draw in the main regional, subregional, and other actors 
into discussions on how best to regulate criminal accountability so that effective across-the-
board solutions can be found.
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